Par Citron (Citron) le jeudi 04 mars 2004 - 02h29:

Israeli official visits Tunisia
Tunisia-Israel, Politics, 9/9/2003

The Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot said yesterday that an official at the Israeli foreign ministry is visiting Tunisia to discuss means of renewing diplomatic relations between the two countries and ending the warning over the travel of the Israelis to Tunisia.

The paper said that the chairman of the North Africa and Morocco department at the Israeli foreign ministry Shaloum Cohen met with the director general of the Tunisian foreign ministry and handed him a personal message from the Israeli foreign minister Shalom Silvan.

The paper indicated that Cohen met also high ranking figures at the Tunisian Presidential palace at the foreign ministry and officials from the Jewish community in Tunisia.

The paper said that the Tunisian side asked for ending the warning issued by the Israeli foreign ministry for its citizens over traveling to Tunisia. The paper quoted high ranking Tunisian officials as saying during the talks with Cohen that if progress is attained in the peace process, they will reopen the Israeli diplomatic mission in Tunisia and there might be a Tunisian representation in Israel.

Tunisia has closed its representation office in Israel after the eruption of the Palestinian Intifada in 2000.

Par Citron (Citron) le samedi 21 février 2004 - 22h41:

ISRAEL AND TUNISIA: BETWEEN BOURGUIBISM AND NASSERISM
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue2/jv4n2a7.html
The earliest contacts between Israel and Tunisia were established in New York in 1951-1952, at the height of Tunisia’s independence drive, when Tunisian representatives approached the Israeli mission to the UN or Israeli labor leaders, often through the good offices of American politicians. (2) Among the Neo-Destour Party envoys who met with Israeli officials was Bahi Ladgam, a senior member of the party’s political bureau and a close confidant of Tunisia’s nationalist leader and future president, Habib Bourguiba. In a June 25, 1952, meeting between Ladgam and Gideon Raphael of Israel’s UN mission, Ladgam sought support for a resolution backing Tunisian independence and assured Raphael that his party was not behind the anti-Jewish riots that plagued Tunis at the time. (3) Israel also had contacts with another Tunisian, Salah Ben Youssef, who later became a Nasserist and Bourguiba’s chief political opponent. Ben Youssef approached the Israelis on February 9, 1953, to express frustration with Israel’s lack of support for Tunisia and explained that the Arab states were the only ones assisting Tunisia’s independence efforts and that it was inevitable that Tunisia would side with them in the future. (4)

Bourguiba himself first advocated a settlement with Israel in a June 1952 interview with Le Monde. While in political exile in France two years later, Bourguiba told Alec L. Easterman, head of the WJC’s political bureau in London, that a future Tunisian government would enter the Arab League but would not necessarily follow Arab League policies or support its political activities. As an individual, Bourguiba said that he understood Jewish nationalism, but as an Arab, he felt compelled to regard the establishment of the state of Israel as a form of colonialism. Yet as a matter of practical politics, he could not support Israel’s elimination and would seek peace in the Middle East by playing a vital role to influence Arab states in this direction. (5)

Israeli officials were divided over whether to maintain secret ties to pre-independence Tunisia and Morocco. Some believed that contacts could safeguard the position of Maghrebi Jews, while others maintained that open channels, as in the Ladgam-Raphael meeting, would result in negative French reactions. (6)

From the end of 1953 until October 1955, when Moshe Sharett served as Israel’s prime minister and foreign minister, he did not endorse secret ties but supported future Israeli-Maghrebi cooperation so as “to prevent the extension of the Arab boycott to North Africa and to…set a precedent to our relations with Arab countries.” (7) In the governments of David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol, Israel opted for both open and back channels once France granted Tunisia and Morocco independence in 1956. They envisioned in the Nasser-Bourguiba rift a trend that could weaken Arab unity.

In February 1956, when Tunisia and Morocco were about to achieve independence, Bourguiba held a discreet meeting with Ya’akov Tsur, Israel’s ambassador to France in which the former’s dislike for Nasser was plainly evident. Tsur understood that it was vital for Bourguiba to enlist American Jewry’s endorsement for securing U.S. economic aid. (8)

Unofficial Israeli-Tunisian meetings continued until the outbreak of the Suez crisis later that year. On October 3, 1956, after Tunisia achieved independence, Tsur met with the Tunisian finance minister who requested Israeli aid in building cooperative agricultural settlements. Tsur, who also met with another Bourguiba aide, was authorized to accede to Tunisian requests with the aim of weakening the Arab economic boycott and entering the Maghrebi sphere. The parties agreed that Paris would best serve as the center for coordinating joint projects under the aegis of Pinhas Sapir, Israel’s minister of commerce and industry. (9)

Israel’s foreign ministry justified assistance to Tunisia by arguing that Bourguiba would not identify with the Arab League’s economic policies toward Israel; joint economic cooperation could be mutually beneficial; and Israel’s labor federation could collaborate unofficially with its Tunisian counterpart, paving the path for other types of institutional cooperation. (10) However, nothing came of these possibilities following the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in October-November 1956, and once Tunisia joined the Arab League in October 1958.

In joining the Arab League, Bourguiba did not conceal his displeasure with pan-Arabism. Except for a brief lull in 1961-1963, when Nasser manifested solidarity with Tunisia’s struggle against French troops who held a naval base in the Tunisian city of Bizerta, by the mid-1960s the breach between the two leaders became irreconcilable. Bourguiba boycotted Arab League meetings over differences related to inter-Arab issues, and even allowed Jews to leave for Israel via France, permitting the Jewish Agency to maintain operations in Tunis. But Bourguiba could ill afford to nurture ties with Israel and in fact toughened his stance. In a 1959 interview with a Lebanese newspaper, he asserted: “If you wish to end the existence of a given country, you should prepare the strategies that will result in her elimination. We do not have commercial and diplomatic ties with Israel.” (11) Additional attacks raised doubts about Tunisia’s image as a moderating force in the Arab world. (12) An expert on the Maghreb at the Quai d’Orsay assuaged Israeli concerns saying that Bourguiba’s aggressive behavior regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict was intended to impress other Arab states; in the future he could in fact mediate between Israel and the Arabs. (13)

The collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961, Egyptian efforts in 1963 to resuscitate Arab unity, Nasser’s military involvement in Yemen, and the emergence of Arab summitry as a channel for inter-Arab dialogues, motivated Bourguiba to promote state particularism over pan-Arabism. (14) Early in 1964, Bourguiba expressed skepticism about Middle East peace. He proposed that the Palestinians organize themselves within an Algerian-style National Liberation Front (FLN) movement, and thought the best way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict was to resettle Israeli Jews outside the region. Yet Bourguiba knew that resettlement was unrealistic and had doubts about effective Arab military options against Israel. Moreover, he believed that the West would never allow Arab states to win a war against the Jews. (15)

In March 1965, Bourguiba posed a genuine challenge to Arab leaders in a speech he delivered in Jordan, publicly urging them to recognize Israel in return for negotiations in the spirit of UN Resolution 181 (1947) recommending the partition of Palestine, and Resolution 194 (1948) calling for the return of Arab refugees to their homes. (16) While in October 1966, he attacked Israel as a Zionist state that dispossessed Muslim and Christian Arabs, he called for an “equitable solution” to the Arab-Israeli conflict. (17)

Bourguiba was a man of great ability and intelligence, but also one of great vanity. He was frustrated that Tunisia’s small size and few resources would prevent it from playing as large a role in world affairs as Egypt. (18) Some believed that Bourguiba was impelled to promote dramatic and creative policies to attract attention and, given Tunisia’s marginal status in Arab affairs, economic aid from the West. By calling for Arab-Israeli negotiations and leading the few Arab states that refused to sever diplomatic relations with West Germany for opening an embassy in Tel Aviv, Bourguiba, it was thought, hoped to secure U.S. and European economic support and simultaneously discredit Nasser by portaying him as anti-Western and a war monger.

Indeed, in May 1965, Tunisian foreign minister Habib Bourguiba Jr. (the president’s son) came to Washington in search of financial support for Tunisia’s four-year economic development plan. The State Department prodded the Israelis to “convince” the Germans and the French to grant Tunisia $20 million in aid, and for Israel to purchase Tunisian wine. (19) The Israelis intervened on behalf of Tunisia without prior coordination with Tunis. It was hoped that despite Tunisia’s relatively marginal role in inter-Arab affairs, Bourguiba might enlist the help of moderate Arab leaders and together they would foil or sabotage Egyptian and Syrian Arab unity efforts.

Regarding Bourguiba’s unrealistic proposal involving UN Resolution 181, some Israeli observers thought that Bourguiba did not seriously believe any pre-1949 UN resolution could serve as a basis for negotiations; he wanted to break the psychological barriers that prevented an Arab-Israeli dialogue.

Arguments about his objectives notwithstanding, the Foreign Ministry under Golda Meir and her successor, Abba Eban, spared no effort to approach Bourguiba and boost his prestige. In November 1965, on the occasion of Bourguiba’s visit to Liberia, upon the request from Liberian security services and with the knowledge of the head of Tunisian security, the Israeli Mossad reinforced local security personnel in Bourguiba’s security detail. (20)

Equally intriguing was the Foreign Ministry’s effort to promote Bourguiba’s candidacy for the 1966 Nobel Peace Prize. Wanting to spare him embarrassment, it was decided that a third party would handle the matter. Thus, Hebrew University professor Nathan Rottenstreich, in conjunction with Israel’s ambassador in Washington, chose the rector of the University of Brazil to recommend Bourguiba to the prize committee. It was clear from the outset that Bourguiba would not receive the Nobel Prize, which was offered to individuals who actually resolved conflicts, but as one Foreign Ministry official observed: “It is important that we are able to bring to Bourguiba’s attention that we are behind the initiative.” (21)

Beginning in 1966, Israel’s ambassador to France, Walter Eytan (with help from the Mossad) initiated secret talks in Europe with Muhammad Masmudi, Tunisia’s ambassador in Paris, with Bourguiba’s blessings. Simultaneously, the WJC’s Easterman maintained direct links to Bourguiba and his son, as well as Masmudi. The Bourguibas preferred that their own personal contact with Israel be maintained indirectly through Easterman, while all other direct Israeli-Tunisian channels would go through diplomats in Europe. Because Israel’s Foreign Ministry could not have a direct pipeline to the Bourguibas as late as 1967, they continued to rely on Easterman, yet without telling him of their back channel links to Masmudi. It appears that Masmudi and the Bourguibas cooperated with Israel over this matter. Moreover, Abba Eban also met with Masmudi on at least one occasion at the home of Baron Edmond de Rothschild.

There were at least five components of these back channel deliberations. First, it was conveyed to the Tunisians that the Israelis appreciated Bourguiba’s challenge to Nasserism, even if they opposed the pre-1949 UN resolutions on which he based his peace proposal. In March 1966, at a meeting in Tunis with Bourguiba and his son, Easterman said that Foreign Minister Eban authorized him to praise Bourguiba “for the wise and statesmanlike effort toward a new approach to peace and conciliation between the Middle East Arab states and Israel,” and for the struggle “to bring about an end to Nasser’s intransigent and inflammatorily demagogic policies for an Arab war to destroy the State of Israel.” Bourguiba told Easterman that many Arab leaders knew that his views were sound but they did not yet have the courage to support him; they were still obsessed by “the fiction of Nasserist power.” Referring to pan-Arabists, Bourguiba portrayed them as unscrupulous, ruining every move to settle Arab-Israeli tensions by conciliatory means. Above all, Israel and Tunisia needed to exercise prudence, to gain time and to let his ideas sink steadily into the Arab mindset. Bourguiba was prepared to accept contact for high-level cooperation, but would refuse to do anything that directly or indirectly implied entering into diplomatic relations with Israel. (22)

Second, in his meeting with Easterman in Paris on October 4, 1966, Masmudi recommended that Tunisian-Israeli economic contacts be facilitated by Western Jews with vital positions in finance. Tunisia and Israel would thus be insured against attack “by their enemies” as forming any devious arrangements between themselves, while both might benefit economically from the appropriate non-Israeli Jewish elements. (23) Likewise, Tunisia’s Muhammad Sfar met with the Israelis in Paris about “Jewish” investments. He never told Tunisian bank directors and industrialists that the potential “Jewish” investments he represented were Israeli-inspired, as Israel’s direct involvement needed to be camouflaged. The projects discussed with Sfar included the construction of a hotel in Mahdia, as a collaborative venture of Sfar and a jointly-owned company by Israel and Baron Edmond de Rothschild; developing a glass factory in Tunis; and furnishing hotel equipment by Israel via a British firm. (24)

Third, the Tunisians expected Israel to pressure the French to improve Franco-Tunisian relations, which had deteriorated since 1961, and to influence the United States and West Germany to grant economic assistance and military aid. (25)

Fourth, Tunisia made no secret of its desire to expand tourism. In the final months of her tenure at the Foreign Ministry, Golda Meir urged Israel’s ambassador in Washington to enlist Jewish-American support by requesting local communities to add Tunisia to their list of tourist attractions. He was told that should these endeavors succeed, “we will find the way to inform the Tunisians that the operations were initiated by us as a token of goodwill.” (26) Indeed, Jewish-American organized tour groups did arrive in Tunisia in 1965. (27) Easterman also informed Bourguiba Jr. that Israel was prepared to offer its skills in the field of tourism and that the increasing trend for travel among world Jewry, especially American Jews, could be an important financial potential for Tunisia’s tourist traffic. (28)

Last on the list was assistance in agricultural development. As Easterman told Bourguiba Jr., Israel was universally known for developing modern agricultural industries and had passed along its experience and techniques to a number of new African states. The Israeli government, he said, was “most willing and ready to put them at the service of Tunisia.” (29)

In the final analysis, Bourguiba was reluctant to seek any direct long-range Israeli ties, and so it is difficult to know if anything came of most of these proposals. Arab territorial losses, and the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization, engendered new realities which left few options for a peace settlement. Not totally disillusioned, Bourguiba confided in Easterman in October 1967 that Arab leaders would eventually negotiate with Israel but that permanent peace could not be achieved as long as Israel insisted on the principle of “what we have conquered we hold.” He hinted that in light of recent circumstances it would be better for him to reduce his overt endorsement of a Middle East peace initiative. (30)

During the October 1973 Middle East War, Bourguiba supported the Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel and, like other Maghrebi states, sent troops to bolster the Arab effort. Despite his preference for “state particularism” over pan-Arab unity, since 1970 he flirted for a while with Muammar Qadhafi over a Tunisian-Libyan union. In October 1976, Bourguiba once again flaunted to the Arab states and the PLO the need to accept UN Resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine. The Sadat peace initiative of November 1977 buried such proposals once and for all. In the 1980s, Bourguiba demonstrated deep solidarity with the PLO, allowing it in 1982 to set up its headquarters in Tunis following its expulsion from Lebanon, leading in 1985 and 1988 to retaliatory military and commando operations by Israel on Tunisian soil. He also agreed to have the Arab League headquarters transferred from Cairo to Tunis once the Arab states isolated Egypt for signing a peace agreement with Israel. This does not preclude secret Israeli-Tunisian discussions after 1967; but these, if they occurred, amounted to very little. Bourguiba’s anti-Islam policies led to Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali’s palace coup of November 7, 1987. Ben Ali, following the 1993 Oslo accords, emulated Morocco’s example by opening in 1995 a liaison office in Tel Aviv and allowing Israel to do the same in Tunis. In 1997, the head of this office was recalled in protest against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Middle East policies, but a new representative, Tariq Azuz, was sent to Israel following the 1999 Israeli elections


NOTES
1) Interviews with Uri Avneri (23 October 1996); Elkana Galli (18 September 1996).
2) Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the 20th Century. (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 283.
3) Ibid, pp. 284-285.
4) Israel UN Delegation, February 18, 1953, Israel State Archives (ISA), Foreign Ministry (FM), 3043/18.
5) Conversation with Bourguiba, August 9, 1954, secret, ISA/FM, 2541/21A.
6) See footnote 2 (p. 284-285).
7) A. Barkai to the Bern Legation, Jerusalem, February 14, 1956, ISA/FM, 2542/7.
8) Y. Tsur to FM, Paris, February 6, 1956, top secret, ISA/FM, 2541/26.
9) R. Dubek to FM, Jerusalem, October 3, 1956, ISA/FM, 2541/26.
0) R. Dubek to FM, October 12, 1956, ISA/FM, 2541/26.
11) al-Hayat (March 19, 1959).
12) Oslo Dagbladet (June 2, 1961).
13) Z. Zak to FM, June 13, 1961, ISA/FM, 3316/3.
14) Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 81.
15) Y. Vered to Y. Meroz, Jerusalem, secret, February 7, 1964, ISA/FM, 3549/4.
16) Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 80.
17) Habib Bourguiba’s Speech at the UN General Assembly, October 10, 1966.
18) Peter Mansfield, Egypt’s Nasser, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 91.
19) D. Yenon to the FM, Washington, May 4, 1965, secret, ISA/FM, 3549/4.
20) Embassy in Monrovia to FM, November 24, 1965, secret, ISA/FM, 3549/2.
21) S. Bar-Hayyim to A. Harman, Jerusalem, October 20, 1965, ISA/FM, 3549/2.
22) A. L. Easterman to A. Eban, London, March 1966, ISA/FM, 4027/6.
23) Conversation with Muhammad Masmudi, London, October 21, 1966, ISA/FM, 4097/4.
24) Note sent to FM, ISA/FM, 4097/4.
25) M. Gazit to A. Eban, Jerusalem, May 3, 1966, top secret, ISA/FM, 4077/3.
26) Bar-Hayyim to A. Harman, Jerusalem, June 4, 1965, top secret, ISA/FM, 4077/3.
27) Same as Footnote 22.
28) Ibid.
29) Ibid.
30) Easterman to A. Eban, London, October 27, 1967, ISA/FM, 4097/4.

Par Citron (Citron) le samedi 21 février 2004 - 21h51:

Israel to cooperate with Tunisia, Egypt in tourism computerization



The Ministry of Tourism recently signed up for a European Union (EU) sponsored Mediterranean computerization project.

The project involves the development of an Internet portal to promote cultural tourism in eight Mediterranean countries. The other participants in the project besides Israel are Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Cyprus, Turkey, France, and Italy.

Cultural tourism focuses on archeology, history, theater, music, museums, etc. Setting up the portal will take two years, at a total estimated cost of €2.5 million. 80% of the budget will come from the EU; the participating countries will furnish the balance.

Israel will receive EU funding to promote its part of the portal. The Ministry of Tourism believes the project will greatly contribute to the promotion of Israeli culture and internal tourism in Israel.

Ministry of Tourism director of electronic marketing Ami Zuberi and director of international relations division Hagit Ringel said, “Israel’s cultural tourism is one of the country’s main and most developed sources of tourism.”



http://www.index.co.il/tourism/article_page.asp?info_id=152691

Par Albert (Albert) le samedi 21 février 2004 - 21h17:

Ecris nous en Français Citron, nous sommes sur un site Tune ici.. Merci. Traduction s'il te plait.

Par Citron (Citron) le samedi 21 février 2004 - 03h35:

The Jerusalem Post
Jan. 30, 2004

Grant's Tunisia visit causes tension
By OFER RONEN-ABELS

National team coach Avraham Grant's surprise visit to the African Nations Cup tournament in Tunisia earlier this week has led to a public rift with his employers, the Israel Football Association. IFA officials were surprised and angered by photos of Grant draped in the Tunisian flag and surrounded by local fans that were published exclusively by Yediot Ahronot on Wednesday.
The main reason behind the outrage is the fact that Grant called IFA spokesperson Shaul Aizenberg on Tuesday night saying that he might be on his way to Tunisia. It appears, however, that Grant was already in Tunisia when he made that phone call – especially since the photos that appeared in the Hebrew daily were taken in broad daylight and published on Wednesday morning.

Speaking Wednesday night, IFA chairman Itche Menachem confirmed he knew nothing of Grant's visit and did not try to hide his indignation when he said, "I intend to investigate this issue. Grant was not traveling on behalf of the IFA, as it was completely private. But at the same time if I learn that he planned this visit and kept that away from us – I will be extremely cross."

On Thursday it became known that Grant received an invitation from Tunisia's Sporting Ambassador, Shukri Al-Wa'ar, who is one of the African country's footballing greats, and who assisted in obtaining the entry visa.

Tunisia is not considered an enemy country by Israel although there are no diplomatic ties between the two.

However, as a public figure, Grant could be considered a security risk and he didn't inform any Israeli official of his planned trip.

Grant is set for a showdown with the IFA chairman when they meet in Dublin next week as part of the talks to determine the fixture list for Israel's World Cup 2006 qualifying campaign

thinks to pinacolada

Par Bekhor (Bekhor) le dimanche 19 octobre 2003 - 20h49:

CITRON,
Je pense que tout dialogue avec toi est un langage de sourds.

Que tu le veuille ou non, Le peuple Tunisien etait content du depart des Palestiniens, meme si tu affirme le contraire, plusieurs amis TUNISIENS MUSULMANS se sont plaints ici en France, du mauvais comportement des palestiniens en Tunisie, et ce a tous les nivaux.
(tu sais tres bien que la critique politique "ca craint en Tunisie")

J'epargne les lecteurs sur certains details que m'ont rapportes mes amis Tunisiens et qui n'ont pas lieux d'etres cites ici.

Je n'en demord pas que ce raid Israelien, n'est pu etre executer sans l'aide logistique du gouvernement Tunisien.

Et ce que tu le veuille ou non.

De toute facon ni je n'ai, ni tu n'a acces aux arcanes des secrets des republique Tunisienne ou Israeliennes.

Par Citron (Citron) le dimanche 19 octobre 2003 - 19h00:

bekhor


"Tu a oublie que les Tunisiens ne savaient pas comment ce debarasser de cet organisme terroriste qui etait lourd pour son estomac."

la tunisie a acceuilli de facon volontaires les palestiniens virés du liban et je pense que Bourguiba n'était pas assez fou pour acceuilir des activistes armées qui aurait pu troubler la sécurité en tunisie: l'acceuil des palestiniens en tunisie est un acte pris pas les dirigeants de lÉpoque est je ne pense pas que l 'OLP en 1985, est été un poid pour la tunisie.

"Tu devrais etre fier en tant que juif,vivant en Tunisie, d'etre issu du peuple qui a aide la Tunisie a se debarasser d'organisations terroristes."

comment je pourrais étre fier d'une attaque armée israélienne qui a tué 68 personnes dont 20 tunisiens innocents !!!!
cet attaque a été suivie par un fort sentiment anti-juif , dois -je remercier tsahal pour ca ?
cette attaque a été suivie par l'assasinat de 4 juifs a jerba? devrais-je remercier tsahal?

"Tu sait tres bien que ce n'est pas la Tunisie qui etait visee."
oui je le sais trés bien , mais cet acte n'a fait que monter le sentiment anti-israelien et meme anti-juif.
aprés la mort des civils tunisiens innocents,je peut comprendre un tunisien qui me dis qu'il n'aime pas ou déteste israel.

"Et ce raid n'aurait pas pu etre fait sans l'aide de l'armee Tunisienne"
je ne le pense pas car la tunisie na pas lhabitude d etre bombardée par des armées venus de l'étranger,elle n est pas donc préparé a riposter a ce genre d'attaque.

Par Citron (Citron) le vendredi 17 octobre 2003 - 22h53:

une autre commémarotion;

"Following Israel's bombing In 1, October 1985, a Tunisian guard opened fire on worshipers in a synagogue in Djerba, killing five people, four of them Jewish. Since then, the government has sought to prevent further tragedy by giving Tunisian Jews heavy protection when necessary..."

Par Citron (Citron) le vendredi 17 octobre 2003 - 22h26:

92. Press Conference Following Israel Air Force Attack on PLO base in Tunis, 1 October 1985.

Mounting wave of terror against Israelis and Jews, in Israel, in the areas and abroad, culminating with the murder of three Israelis in Larnaca's harbour, led the government of Israel to seek new ways to combat terror. Since it was evident that the attacks were masterminded by the PLO and the various organizations under its umbrella, Israel decided to attack the PLO headquarters in Tunis. In a daring, long distance aerial raid, Israeli planes bombed a PLO base in Tunis, some 4800 kilometers from Israel. 60 terrorists were killed, including some senior members of "Force 17. " Arafat was not in Tunis at the time, but his headquarters was hit. The reasons for the raid were given in the following press conference by Defense Minister Rabin, Chief of Staff Moshe Levy and Air Force Commander Amos Lapidol:

Mr. Rabin: For a long time now, we have been aware of, have felt the effort of the terrorist organizations - first and foremost the terrorist organizations of the PLO headed by Arafat - to carry out attacks from everywhere and anywhere that Israelis or Israeli targets are to be found: In Israel and abroad. As long as PLO terrorism, or any other terrorism operates against Israel, Israel will fight against it. Israel will determine the manner of combat and the site of the attack in accordance with its own considerations exclusively. The target this time was not personnel directly involved with operations, but the headquarters that decides, plans and directs the attacks, whether from the north or in the administered areas or from the sea, and against Israelis, such as the abhorrent murder of the three Israelis in Larnaca. This operation was designed to clarify that no PLO element anywhere in the world has immunity. The long arm of the IDF will be able to reach, hit and punish. This was the aim of the operation, and I believe that as such it attained its entire goal.

There will be some who will no doubt argue that such an operation will harm the prospects of the peace process. Israel wants peace, Israel wants to further the peace process. But if there is anything that harms the prospects of the peace process, it is the PLO's terrorist effort headed by Arafat - and therefore it is inconceivable that even though we want peace, we will not combat terrorism in all its forms.

In conclusion, I want to express, through the chief of staff and the commander of the air force, my deep appreciation for the IDFs planning capability, for the IAF's operational ability - this was an operation which was carried out to perfection. Congratulations to the IDF, the air force, to those who planned and carried out this operation.

Chief of Staff Levy: We are dealing here with a preliminary summation of the attack. The target was a central PLO command post which operates as a full-fledged headquarters. We have had many reports since this headquarters was set up - for about three years - on direct and indirect activities of implementing terrorism [from the base]. The headquarters is more or less a separate camp around 700 meters by 700 meters on the sea shore, in an area called Hamain A-Shatt. The problems we faced in this attack were of range - about 1,300 nautical miles, or 2,300 kms.; the second problem was one of precision: It's true that the camp is separate, but there could be civilians or civilian structures or civilian activity in direct proximity to it. We also paid special attention to a school, a kind of boarding school, which is directly proximate to the command post.

There are more buildings in the command post than those we attacked. We attacked central buildings, such as the building in which the PLO's head, Yasser Arafat, has offices; an adjacent building connected with that; a building containing the HQ of "Force 17" and an adjacent building containing communications and perhaps also lodgings; and another building which contained a command post of the organization of these forces and operations: These are the building that were chosen, attacked and hit.

We knew before the attack that PLO and terrorist circles in various places estimated that an Israeli attack or blow or operation could be forthcoming, mainly in the wake of the murder in Larnaca, which seems to us a particularly problematic operation: A kind of process of cold-blooded murder abroad with an entire apparatus designed to hide the fact that those behind this murder are precisely those persons who say they know nothing about it - as though they want to attain the impact of the attack without being ready to bear its consequences. I think that despite these advance appraisals, according to what we have seen until now, the attack in fact came as a surprise in many senses. We know of dozens of casualties - as of now I would put it at between 30 and 50 killed, and a larger number of wounded.

I want to conclude by saying that the war against terrorism must be constant - I think that this is one of its expressions - it must also be systematic and diversified with respect to the places and methods regarding which we will implement our force, as we find appropriate. Congratulations to those who succeeded in giving us the information - the anonymous intelligence corps - and to those who carried it out: The air force and those who took part in the implementation. To the best of my estimation, the implementation was fully consistent with what was planned.

Air Force Commander Lapidot: Today at about 11:00 hours we attacked a PLO command post in Tunisia. Taking part in the attack were a number of air force war planes. Within the attack target, which is a relatively large area, a number of command buildings were designated for us for destruction. The targets were destroyed. All the targets designated for destruction were hit accurately. All our planes returned safely. What characterizes this operation for the air forces is a long flight range; in fact, this is the longest offensive operation carried out by the air force to date. In this operation we made use of the means of ammunition which are suitable for destroying the targets on the one hand, while refraining from hitting civilians or buildings not connected with these headquarters on the other hand. As I noted, we succeeded in hitting and destroying the command posts that were designated.

Summary of Question and Answers:

Asked whether the PLO bases in Jordan were also not immune from such attacks, Defense Minister Rabin said: "I repeat that no PLO terrorist target is immune, no matter where it is located, against attack by us. I don't want you to draw conclusions from this regarding if and when we will decide to attack such a target. I will add no more." As to whether the attack will harm the peace process, Mr. Rabin said he had heard that Egypt was suspending the Taba talks, but said he thought it was "in the interest of Egypt and Israel alike" to clarify the points in dispute between the two countries. He said that he believed that even if there were to be a certain suspension, "the process will continue because it is in the interest of both our countries." As for peace talks with other countries, the defense minister said it was "inconceivable that terrorism should operate against us but that we will not operate against it in the appropriate manner, with an overall approach, and with freedom in choosing the targets and the means for the war against terrorism."

Mr. Rabin said also that "the time has come to hit at not only the implementers, not only the intermediate levels, not only the instigators, but at the upper echelon that takes the decisions to execute terrorist operations, and the headquarters that serve the upper echelon."

Mr. Rabin said he did not know whether Tunisia had been directly warned against harboring terrorists, but said that senior Israeli officials had often asserted that Israel would not be able to acquiesce in the free activity of terrorists. "We have no interest in a confrontation with Tunisia," he said. "The target was not Tunisia. The target was PLO headquarters dealing in terrorism which are in fact in a state of extraterritorial control in the area where they are situated in Tunisia."

Air Force Commander Lapidot said there had been no attempt to interfere with the Israeli planes during their mission.

Asked whether the U.S. had been informed in advance, Mr. Rabin replied: "Israel is an independent state where taking steps vital to our security is concerned. With respect to terrorism in particular, we take decisions on our own. We informed the Americans, as we did others, only after the completion of the actual operation."

http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0inv0

Par Bekhor (Bekhor) le jeudi 16 octobre 2003 - 13h09:

CITRON,
Tu ne t'est jamais demande si ce raid Israelien n'a pas ete fait avec la benediction du gouvernement Tunisien??.
Tu a oublie que les Tunisiens ne savaient pas comment ce debarasser de cet organisme terroriste qui etait lourd pour son estomac.

Je vais finir par croire que tu est un veritable enfant de coeur.

Tu devrais etre fier en tant que juif, plus que tu te pretend juif,vivant en Tunisie, d'etre issu du peuple qui a aide la Tunisie a se debarasser d'organisations terroristes.

Tu sait tres bien que ce n'est pas la Tunisie qui etait visee.

Et ce raid n'aurait pas pu etre fait sans l'aide de l'armee Tunisienne, en tout cas c'est l'avis de plusieurs tacticiens internationnaux qui avait disserter sur le sujet a l'epoque.

Par Citron (Citron) le mercredi 15 octobre 2003 - 20h41:

HAMMAM-CHATT, UN 1er OCTOBRE 1985…Un crime impuni





Le 1er octobre 1985, la Tunisie a été victime d’un raid israélien visant le QG de l’OLP qui avait élu domicile, depuis son départ forcé de Beyrouth en septembre 1982, à Hammam-Chatt situé à 28 kilomètres au Sud de la Capitale. Ce raid a été qualifié de “ violation inadmissible des règles du droit international ” et d’“acte de terrorisme d’Etat ” et condamné vivement tant par les Tunisiens que par la communauté internationale, à l’exception des Etats-Unis. Le “ revirement ” de l’Administration Reagan a abouti à l’abstention américaine au Conseil de Sécurité. La résolution adoptée, tout en condamnant l’acte d’agression israélien, a estimé que la Tunisie a droit à des réparations.

Dix-huit années se sont écoulées depuis le 4 octobre 1985, date de l’adoption de la Résolution 573. Qu’est-il alors advenu de ce texte qui fut salué à l’époque comme un “ triomphe ” de la diplomatie tunisienne?


Dans la matinée du mardi 1er octobre 1985, Tunis était sous l’effet de grondements effrayants et de bruits assourdissants d’explosions retentissant dans sa banlieue Sud. Des bombardements aériens de l’aviation israélienne pleuvaient sur les installations palestiniennes de Borj Cedria, larguant, à quelques minutes d’intervalle, leurs bombes d’un poids de 2.000 à 2.500 pounds (un pound = 400 gr environ) selon certaines sources, et de 1.000 pounds selon la lettre du gouvernement tunisien au Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU. Huit mirages volant à basse altitude avaient effectué, de leurs bases, 4.800 kilomètres aller-retour.

Un spectacle de désolation et d’horreur

Trois assauts successifs de l’aviation de Tsahal accomplis avec une telle précision qu’après quelques poussières de minutes, il ne subsistait plus rien du QG de l’OLP transformé en champ de ruines. Une fumée emplissant le ciel d’où des avions, avant de disparaître, larguaient des ballons-leurres destinés à déjouer la défense aérienne. Bâtiments en miettes, voitures brûlées. Le quotidien Le Temps avait titré dans son édition du 2 octobre : “ Des décombres… des cadavres. La mort est passée par là ” et décrit comme suit le spectacle désolant : “ Chaussées défoncées, arbres jonchant le sol, voitures calcinées, pans de murs parsemés d’éclats et plusieurs bâtiments complètement rasés, c’est ce qu’ont laissé derrière eux les six F16 israéliens qui ont pilonné hier matin, la paisible localité de Hammam-Plage, siège du commandement de la Résistance palestinienne ”. De nombreuses victimes tunisiennes et palestiniennes gisaient à ras le sol et sous les décombres. L’hebdomadaire français L’Express rapportait, dans sa livraison du 11 octobre, la panique et l’affolement de la population : “ Des cris surgissent de partout. Des mourants et des morts, déshabillés par le souffle, ont le corps noirci de brûlures… ”. “ Mon fils a été décapité ”, s’écria la mère de Mahjoub Jellab tué à l’âge de 16 ans “ complètement décapité, et la jambe gauche arrachée par les effets des éclats de bombes ”, assura, au quotidien Le Temps, la mère qui a fini par retrouver son fils à la morgue de l’hôpital Habib Thameur décrite par Jeune Afrique (du 16 octobre) comme “ un vulgaire frigo de boucherie ” où “ gît (parmi d’autres) un jeune corps serré dans un jeans, le crâne fracassé ” ; “ des membres épars, bras et jambes, censés lui appartenir, sont amassés au pied de la civière ”. Une horreur indicible.

Un raid de représailles

L’opération-exploit revendiqué par Israël, tout comme le fameux raid d’Entebbe de 1976, en Ouganda (à 3.500 km de Tel-Aviv) pour libérer des Israéliens retenus par des pirates de l’air, avait été considérée à cette époque comme “ haut fait du palmarès de Tsahal ” et comme “ un des raids de représailles les plus spectaculaires jamais effectués par l’aviation israélienne ”. Elle surprit plus d’un observateur par sa prouesse technique, sa précision et sa rapidité et fut qualifiée par la presse occidentale comme “ le raid le plus audacieux de l’histoire ” israélienne. “ Tous les avions israéliens ont regagné leur base, indemnes. Les pilotes ont déclaré avoir atteint avec précision leurs objectifs ”, a précisé le communiqué du commandement militaire israélien. Le cynisme des commanditaires de cette opération avait alors suscité de nombreuses réactions des capitales occidentales et arabes ainsi qu’une vague d’indignations et de protestations à travers le pays, voire dans les rangs des étudiants destouriens que Bourguiba aurait autorisés à manifester leur mécontentement. Selon le quartier général israélien, ce raid, minutieusement préparé, était une riposte contre l’attentat commis le 25 septembre, le jour du Yom Kippour, fête du Grand pardon, à Larnaca (Chypre), contre trois plaisanciers israéliens et revendiqué par la Force 17. Il visait les locaux ex-territoriaux dont l’OLP disposait à Tunis : le bureau de Arafat, un autre abritant le Q.G. du Fatah et un troisième abritant le bureau de la Force 17, le service secret de l’OLP qu’Israël accusait d’être responsable de l’attentat de Larnaca. Et même si Rabbin avait tenu à préciser que l’opération israélienne ne visait ni la Capitale tunisienne, ni une éventuelle confrontation avec le Président Bourguiba, la Tunisie, se sentant humiliée et agressée dans sa souveraineté, déposa une plainte au Conseil de Sécurité qu’elle saisit d’urgence et engagea une bataille diplomatique auprès de l’ONU visant à obtenir la condamnation de l’Etat d’Israël ainsi que des “ réparations appropriées comme suite aux pertes en vies humaines et aux dégâts matériels dont elle a été victime ” (Voir texte de la Résolution) tout en agitant la menace de sanctions obligatoires. Pour Béji Caïd Essebsi, alors ministre des Affaires Etrangères, il s’agissait d’un “ acte de terrorisme ” contre une “ zone urbaine où résident des familles tunisiennes et un nombre réduit de civils palestiniens ”.

La Tunisie à l’ONU

La question qui préoccupait le Président Bourguiba, ami fidèle des Etats-Unis, demeurait la position de ce pays vis-à-vis du raid et le véto américain appréhendé à un moment où l’opposition, toutes tendances confondues, reprochait au gouvernement son alliance avec Washington et exigeait la rupture des relations diplomatiques avec les Etats-Unis, où le sentiment anti-américain se renforçait dans l’opinion publique exaspérée par le manquement des médias vis-à-vis de la couverture de la tragédie (voir communiqué de la LTDH du 1er octobre, signé par Dr Slahedduine Zmerli) et où le différend avec la Libye ainsi que la situation sociale du pays risquaient de mettre le feu aux poudres. La Maison-Blanche avait en effet approuvé, le jour même, le raid israélien le qualifiant de “ légitime contre des actes de terrorisme ”. “ Pour la politique des Etats-Unis, des représailles contre des attaques terroristes sont une réponse légitime et une expression d’autodéfense. D’après les informations préliminaires dont nous disposons, cela semble être le cas ”, a déclaré le porte-parole de la Maison-Blanche, Larry Speakes qui a tenu à ajouter à la fin de sa déclaration “ que par principe, une réponse appropriée à des actes de terrorisme est un acte légitime d’autodéfense ” (AFP, Washington). Le Président Bourguiba “ inquiet ” et “ préoccupé ” par “ le rôle qu’auraient joué les Etats-Unis dans l’opération entreprise par l’aviation israélienne ” et “ étonné ” par “ la position américaine adoptée à la suite de la lâche agression israélienne contre la république tunisienne ”, aurait déclaré à l’ambassadeur américain à Tunis qu’il avait convoqué le lendemain de l’agression, après l’approbation américaine du raid israélien : “ Je suis dans la situation d’un homme qui a toujours cru à la fidélité de son épouse, qui découvre au terme de cinquante années qu’il a été trompé, et qui se demande s’il n’a pas été trompé depuis le début ” (Le Quotidien de Paris, 4/10/85) et demandé des Etats-Unis de “ reconsidérer leur position négative et inattendue vis-à-vis de cette agression, position qui est en contradiction avec la loi et la morale ” (Déclaration de Mahmoud Mestiri du 2/10/85). Béji Caïd Essebsi avait, de son côté, affirmé que la Tunisie saurait “ tirer les conclusions ” du soutien apporté par la Maison-Blanche au raid israélien. Répondant à la demande expresse du Président Bourguiba, Washington a fini par “ réviser ” son évaluation. Tout en exprimant sa “ compréhension ” envers l’opération israélienne présentée comme une “ expression d’autodéfense”, la Maison-Blanche s’est abstenue de reprendre ses affirmations du 1er octobre présentant le raid comme “ légitime ”. “ Une révision qui n’est pas un revirement, mais nuance les termes de la première prise de position. Le porte-parole de la Maison-Blanche a d’ailleurs nié toute modification de l’attitude américaine ”, commentait le journal Le Soir (3/10/85).

La résolution 573 (1985)

Suite à des négociations à propos du texte de la Résolution aboutissant à l’absence de mention relative aux Palestiniens et de condamnation explicite de l’auteur de l’agression (Israël), aux pressions américaines internes et à la position de condamnation ferme des Européens ainsi qu’à l’intervention du Président Bourguiba, les Etats-Unis optèrent pour l’abstention. Le texte de la résolution adoptée était en réalité en-deça par rapport au projet initial présenté par la Tunisie et qui réclamait une condamnation très ferme de l’agresseur et de l’acte de l’agression, des compensations financières pour les dommages subis et des mesures à l’encontre d’Israël pour éviter la répétition de cette agression (AFP, 3/10/85). A cela, Mahmoud Mestiri répondit : “ Certes, nous aurions souhaité la condamnation directe d’Israël, mais plusieurs pays occidentaux et même latino-américains et pas seulement les Etats-Unis ont toujours été réticents pour accepter une formulation qui revêt, de leur point de vue, des implications politiques et juridiques complexes ” (Réalités du11/10/85). Toutefois, cette “ victoire ” diplomatique de la Tunisie avait désamorcé quelque peu la crise si bien qu’on exhala dans les milieux officiels un souffle de soulagement. Mais elle ne manqua pas de provoquer une réaction d’hostilité de la part d’Israël qui, dans une déclaration du 21 novembre 1985 dont elle demanda l’intégration dans le rapport du Secrétaire Général sur l’application de la résolution 573 (1985), avait considéré le texte comme “ totalement inacceptable ”, et en particulier, avait rejeté “ l’usage impropre des termes “ acte d’agression ” et “ acte d’agression armée ”.

Deux mois plus tard, en décembre 1985, la Tunisie a présenté à l’ONU un rapport détaillé des dégâts causés par le raid israélien. Dans ce rapport de 127 pages, élaboré par une commission d’enquête spéciale constituée par le gouvernement tunisien, la Tunisie a avancé le chiffre de 68 victimes ayant trouvé la mort (50 réfugiés palestiniens et 18 citoyens tunisiens) et la somme de 5.432.125 dinars (un peu plus de 6 millions de dollars) évaluant les dégâts matériels du raid. Le gouvernement tunisien se réservait “ le droit de réclamer des dommages et intérêts pour violation de sa souveraineté et atteinte à son développement économique et social ”, compte tenu du fait que, selon la Commission, il était impossible d’évaluer l’ampleur du préjudice subi (AFP, 5-12-1985).

L’histoire retiendra -hélas- que cette résolution estimant que la Tunisie a droit à “ des réparations appropriées suite aux pertes en vies humaines et aux dégâts matériels dont elle a été victime ” et adoptée par 14 voix et une abstention (Etats-Unis), est désormais restée lettre morte. Dix-huit ans après, les Tunisiens attendent toujours l’application de la résolution 573 qui fut votée après moult efforts et d’âpres négociations, un vendredi soir d’un 4 octobre 1985…


TEXTE DE LA RESOLUTION 573 (1985) : adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU, le 4 octobre 1985<



Noura Borsali

redaction@realites.com.tn 09-10-2003

Par Citron (Citron) le mercredi 15 octobre 2003 - 20h57:

TEXTE DE LA RESOLUTION 573 (1985) : adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU, le 4 octobre 1985

“ Le texte définitif de la résolution adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité vendredi 4 octobre 1985, à l’issue du débat sur la plainte de la Tunisie contre Israël :

Le Conseil de Sécurité, ayant examiné la lettre, datée du 1er octobre 1985, par laquelle la Tunisie a porté plainte contre Israël à la suite de l’acte d’agression commis par ce dernier contre la souveraineté et l’intégrité territoriale de la Tunisie.

Ayant entendu la déclaration du ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Tunisie.

Ayant noté avec préoccupation que l’attaque israélienne a causé de nombreuses pertes en vies humaines et des dégâts matériels considérables.

Considérant que, aux termes du paragraphe 4 de l’article 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies, les membres de l’Organisation s’abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recouvrir à la menace ou à l’emploi de la force, soit contre l’intégrité territoriale ou l’indépendance politique de tout Etat, soit de tout autre manière incompatible avec les buts des Nations Unies.

Gravement préoccupé par la menace à la paix et à la sécurité dans la région méditerranéenne causée par l’attaque aérienne perpétrée le 1er octobre 1985 par Israël dans la zone de Hammam-Plage dans la banlieue-Sud de Tunis.

Appelant l’attention sur les graves conséquences que l’agression menée par Israël et tous les actes contraires à la Charte ne peuvent manquer d’engendrer pour toute initiative ayant pour objectif l’instauration d’une paix d’ensemble juste et durable au Moyen-Orient.

Considérant que le gouvernement Israélien a revendiqué la responsabilité de l’attaque dès que celle-ci s’est produite.

1/condamne énergiquement l’acte d’agression armée perpétré par Israël contre le territoire tunisien en violation flagrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, du droit et des normes de conduite internationaux.

2/Exige qu’Israël s’abstienne de perpétrer de tels actes d’agression ou de menacer de le faire.

3/Demande instamment aux Etats membres des Nations Unies de prendre des mesures pour dissuader Israël de recourir à de tels actes contre la souveraineté et l’intégrité territoriale de tous les Etats.

4/Estime que la Tunisie a droit à des réparations appropriées comme suite aux pertes en vies humaines et aux dégâts matériels dont elle a été victime et dont Israël a reconnu être responsable”.





redaction@realites.com.tn 09-10-2003